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Except in topsy-turvey land, you can't die before you are conceived or be
divorced before you even marry or harvest a crop never planted, or burn
down a house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad.
For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofor been accepted as
a sort of logical 'axiom" that the statute of limitations does not begin before
a cause of action exists, i.e., before ajudicial remedy is available to a plaintiff.I
THE NEW YORK STATE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR Toxic TORT CLAIMS
Time for a Discovery Rule
by Deborah L. Christoff
Love Canal, Agent Orange, D.E.S., P.C.B. All are
buzz-words for a situation that has become too familiar
to a society that is confronted with rapid technological
change. We are only beginning to realize that the benefits
of an industrial society carry with them inherent and often
unrecognized burdens on public health and environmental
safety.2
Recently, national and state concems have been focus-
ed on the immediate and long-term problems attributable
to improper hazardous waste disposal. Unfortunately, the
Love Canal phenomenon is not unique. According to En-
vironmental Protection Agency estimates, there are
10,000-12,000 possible hazardous waste sites nationwide,
800 or more of which are in New York State.
3
Grave personal and property damage has been
associated with exposure to hazardous waste,4 prompting
victims to file lawsuits to recover for their injuries, yet these
victims face considerable obstacles before they will win legal
compensation. Toxic tort suits are notoriously difficult to
prove because of our incomplete knowledge of the risks
and latent effects of chemicals. Evolution of legal rules of
proof and evidence has not advanced as rapidly as chemical
evolution. Proof of causation, the legally crucial link be-
tween exposure to a chemical dump site and illness or death,
is complicated by the unpredictable and slow movement
of groundwater and the long lag time between disposal and
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contamination of drinking water. Further, the harm of pollu-
tion frequently does not materialize until long after a dump
site has been closed or deserted. The time between careless
disposal and discovery of contamination often means the
owners or operators of a dump site can no longer be found,
or even if found, they are likely to lack sufficient assets to
compensate victims or pay clean-up costs. 5
Assuming a person injured by hazardous waste ex-
posure can surmount the legal obstacles posed by causa-
tion and identification, he or she may find that New York
law precludes bringing suit to recover damages for injuries,
because the statute of limitations6 expired before the site-
related injuries became manifest. This article will discuss
the public policy justifications and implications of New
York's statute of limitations for personal injury and prop-
erty damage suits brought by victims of hazardous
substance exposure.
THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM
New York State has defined a hazardous waste as a
substance which may "cause an increase in mortality or
serious incapacitating injury or pose a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed, or
otherwise managed."7 According to John Greenthal, Direc-
tor of the Department of Environmental Conservation
Hazardous Waste Enforcement Division, in New York
State there are approximately 895 inactive hazardous
waste sites which represent significant health hazards.
These sites have an estimated clean-up cost of $2 billion.8
Why has the hazardous waste problem reached such
a magnitude? Part of the answer has its source in the "mind-
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boggling quantities of hazardous waste this society
generates." 9 Sources agree that the single biggest producer
of hazardous waste is industry. Other producers include
the federal government, agriculture, research laboratories,
utilities, mines and even households. It is estimated that
industry generates an astonishing 22.4 billion pounds of
hazardous waste annually, nearly 600 pounds per person
per year. Industrial hazardous waste generation is grow-
ing at a rate of three percent annually, meaning that by
the year 2000 we will be producing about twice as much
as we do now."0
Improper disposal methods have also significantly con-
tributed to the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem.
Ninety percent of hazardous waste has been disposed of
in a manner actually or potentially harmful to human health,
lives, livelihoods, property and the national environment."
Horrifying tales of "midnight dumpers" and open storage
sites have become all too common. Land disposal methods
create "hidden menaces" when landfills are unlined or im-
properly lined.12 The nature and magnitude of harmful
health effects caused by toxic waste disposal are undeter-
mined.13 Certainly it cannot be doubted that a public health
problem of unknown magnitude is brewing.
Part of the uncertainty surrounding the effects of
hazardous waste exposure is the long latency period be-
tween initial exposure to a carcinogen and the onset of most
types of cancer.14 Estimates vary; however, latency periods
range from ten to thirty years before the onset of disease.' 5
The result of lengthy latency periods is that exposed
individuals are barred from bringing suit under New York
law. New York State allows a three year limitation for an
action to recover damages for a personal injury. 6 The three
year period is computed from the time the action accrues,'
7
that is, when an individual's legally protected right is in-
vaded, and an injury occurs. In a hazardous substance case,
this invasion occurs when an individual is exposed to a
hazardous substance. In New York State, the Court of Ap-
peals has ruled on the question of when a claim begins to
accrue under the statute of limitations. New York, along
with a minority of state jurisdictions, follows what ij term-
ed an exposure rule,' namely, that a cause of action ac-
crues upon injury, notwithstanding the injured party's
knowledge of the injury.
The Court of Appeals first applied the exposure rule
in Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co. 9 Plaintiff
filed an action for injuries resulting from the inhalation of
dust while he was employed by defendant. The Court of
Appeals found the date of last exposure to be when plain-
tiffs employment had ceased with defendant, which was
more than three years before the suit was instituted. The
Court of Appeals held the injury to plaintiff was complete
at the time the alleged negligence of defendant caused plain-
tiff to inhale the dust. Because plaintiff delayed his admit-
tedly valid claim 20 until after his disease became apparent,
his action was time-barred under the .exposure rule.
The Schmidt exposure rule was affirmed in Schwartz
v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp.2' In Schwartz, plain-
tifs' sinuses were injected with a substance for the purpose
of making them perceptible to x-rays while he served in
the Navy during World War II. In 1957, plaintiff had a car-
cinoma which required the removal of an eye. The
malignancy was allegedly caused by the previous injection.
Suit for damages was commenced in 1959. The Court of
Appeals found plaintiffs action was time-barred; the statute
of limitations had begun to run at the time of the injection
in 1944.22 Chief Judge Desmond's dissent in Schwartz
noted that if plaintiff had not learned of the carcenogenic
qualities of the injection until after his surgical operation
in 1957, it would be "unreasonable and perhaps unconstitu-
tional to hold that his time to sue expired before it was
possible for him to learn of the wrong. "2
The Court of Appeals turned down an invitation to
overrule the Schmidt holding in Thorton v. Roosevelt
Hospital,24 instead concluding that this change is a matter
best left to the legislature and not the courts.2 In Thor-
ton, a thorium dioxide substance was injected into the
deceased plaintiff in 1954 and resulted in the onset of
cancer in 1972 or 1973, when suit was filed. The Court
of Appeals, relying on Schmidt and Schwartz, held plain-
tiffs cause of action accrued at the time of invasion of dece-
dent's body (the injection), and not at the time the
cancerous condition became apparent.26 Consequently,
plaintiffs claim, brought twenty years after decedents in-
jection was time-barred.
Judge Fuchsberg strongly dissented from the Court's
decision in Thorton, arguing that Schmidt and Schwartz
"carry their own seeds of obsolescence" and should be over-
ruled.27 He stated that drugs with a "latent or slowly evolv-
ing potential for harm are no longer unique."28 Judge
Fuchsberg contended that for "right to recover [to] run from
the time it is discoverable is a matter of fundamental
justice." The Judge concluded that the latent injury case
is hardly an appropriate matter on which to await legislative
action.29
In a recent affirmation of the exposure rule, the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division held in Steinhardt v.
Johns-Manville Corp.30 that a cause of action arising from
asbestos inhalation accrued when plaintiff inhaled the
substance, rather than when asbestosis was discovered.31
The Supreme Court cited Schmidt on the matter, holding
"[the] injury occurs when there is a wrongful invasion of
personal or property rights and then the cause of action
accrues ... even though the injured party may be ignorant
of the existence of the wrong or injury."
32
A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals
further complicates the statute of limitations law. In Mar-
tin v. Edwards Laboratories,33 the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that in cases regarding injuries suffered
from faulty heart valves, contraceptive shields or other im-
planted medical devices, the statute of limitations runs
"from the date of the injury resulting from the malfunction"
of the device, not "from the date of [its] implantation or
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Given the state of chemical
technology, the multitude of
toxic and carcinogenic
substances to which one is ex-
posed, and the latency period
before ultimate manifestation
of a disease, the New York
State statute of limitations is
outmoded and bars judicial
relief for a compensable injury
without hearing the merits of
the case.
insertion." A significant factor for the Court's decision is
the plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the malfunction of the
device.
Although the Martin decision is a boon to plaintiffs,
it is nonetheless a compromise. While the Court rejected
as "unrealistic and unnecessary" the time-of-implantation
rule the defense sought, the Court also spumed the date
of discovery rule. However, this decision brings New York
closer to the discovery rule followed by a majority of states.
Time will reveal what impact this decision will have on the
state legislature, which has repeatedly been invited by the
Court of Appeals to enact legislation on this matter. As
Martin was just recently decided, it is not yet clear if its
holding will be extended to other hazardous substance
cases where the plaintiff is equally as ignorant of his or her
injury as a victim of a faultily implanted medical device.
In hazardous waste exposure suits, the Schmidt ex-
posure rule, as applied by the New York Court of Appeals,
would deprive an injured party of a reasonable time in which
to bring suit. When originally conceived, the New York
statute of limitations posed no significant problems; cause
and effect were seen as virtually synonymous events. The
Schmidt court stated "[t]he injury to the plaintiff was com-
plete when the alleged negligence of the defendant caused
the plaintiff to inhale the deleterious dust. For that injury
... defendant was liable."35 However, these traditional rules
will work to bar many valid claims from adjudication.
Hazardous waste cases have the nontraditional problems
of latency between exposure and disease, linking exposure
and disease, identifying the substances to which one was
actually exposed, and finding the owner or generator of the
disposal site. Given the state of chemical technology, the
multitude of toxic and carcinogenic substances to which
one is exposed, and the latency period- before ultimate
manifestation of a disease, the New York State statute of
limitations is outmoded and bars judicial relief for a com-
pensable injury without hearing the merits of the case.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In view of the nontraditional characteristics of hazard-
ous waste cases, strict and slavish application of a statute
of limitations is no longer a viable or desirable procedure.
In ordinary tort situations, statutes of limitations attempt
to balance the competing interests of plaintiff and defen-
dant.36 On one hand, the injured party must be given a
reasonable opportunity to obtain a remedy. On the other
hand, the defendant, after a period of vulnerability, should
have a time of repose in which to plan its affairs without
the possibility of being confronted with stale claims. In ad-
dition, statutes of limitation promote judicial efficiency by
avoiding proof problems in which "evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
37
There is also a presumption that valid claims do not go
neglected. 38 Promptly filed suits should promote just ver-
dicts. Further, the grant of repose to defendants is sup-
posedly insurance against feigned cases.
These traditional considerations are not present in the
hazardous waste suit, especially when plaintiffs injuries
have not yet been discovered. Rather than protecting un-
suspecting defendants against invalid claims, the statute
of limitations operates in these cases to prevent the valid
claims of unsuspecting plaintiffs. -9
The evidentiary and proof problems are considered to
be less significant in hazardous waste cases. 40 The toxic
chemical's existence and hazardous nature are establish-
ed by federal and state agencies before a health emergen-
cy is deemed to exist. The problem of lost records or fading
witnesses' memories is also less significant because this
evidence exists in agency files to facilitate retrieval for suit.
Further, the character of disposal sites as an ongoing public
nuisance diminishes the possibility of feigned claims.
Toxic tort suits are not "stale" as the exposure rule
assumes. A date of discovery rule would allow a cause of
action to be brought when it arises and would not deny
relief to people before they know of their injuries. People
cannot be accused of "sleeping on rights", because they
did not know of their rights until after the statutory period
had expired.
The denial of a hazardous waste suit has greater
ramifications than just dismissing the claim. In hazardous
substances suits, seldom is one person involved. Rather,
a whole community or geographical area is subjected to
undifferentiated harm, and denial of a remedy results in a
loss of a powerful tool to deter tortious conduct. Further,
because hazardous waste suits often result from mass
disasters, they lend themselves to class actions, thus pro-
moting an efficient use of judicial resources. Many of the
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issues in hazardous waste cases will often be the same.
The use of collateral estoppel will also facilitate the resolu-
tion of these cases. 4 If New York courts rigidly follow the
statute of limitations, toxic tortfeasors will be insufficient-
ly deterred from pursuing dangerous disposal techniques
and the long-term risk of injury to the individual and socie-
ty will not be reduced.42 Consequently, the operation of
the statute of limitations to preclude a remedy for an in-
jured individual in the hazardous waste case can act to
subvert public confidence in the legal system.
The Date of Discovery Rule
A majority of state jurisdictions has broken down the
date of exposure barrier by developing date of discovery
rules.43 These courts have recognized the absurdity of re-
quiring a suit to be brought before a plaintiff knows, or can
reasonably be aware of an injury. Although specific applica-
tion varies, a date of discovery rule provides that a period
of limitation does not commence until the plaintiff
discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, his or her injury. The discovery rule has
been applied to various cases involving "inherently
unknowable" harms or injuries that are latent or progressive
in nature.44 Whether this rule will be adopted in New York
State remains to be seen.
New York State Precedent for a Discovery Rule
The rise in interest in compensation for injuries caus-
ed by hazardous substance exposure may signal that the
time is ripe for a change in accrual standards under the
statute of limitations. While the New York courts have
declined to adopt a date of discovery rule,45 there are in-
dications that change is in the air. These indications in-
clude the Court of Appeals' decision in Flanagan v. Mount
Eden General Hospital,46 amendments to the statute of
limitations,47 and the introduction of several bills amending
the statute of limitations during the 207th legislative ses-
sion.48
Flanagan was a medical malpractice suit arising from
plaintiffs surgery in 1958. During the operation, clamps
were inserted into plaintiffs abdomen and were not remov-
ed. Over eight years later, in 1966, plaintiff was correctly
diagnosed as sustaining injury from the clamps, and in a
new operation that year, the clamps were removed. A suit
was later filed in 1966. The Court of Appeals applied a
date of discovery rule in this case because a foreign object
had negligently been left in the patient's body. The statute
of limitations did not begin to run until the patient could
reasonably have discovered the malpractice. 49 Thus, plain-
tiff's suit was not time-barred.
The Court of Appeals found five factors to show com-
patibility with statute of limitations policy: (1) a hospital
record of the negligent procedure; (2) a hospital record of
Rather than protecting un-
suspecting defendants against
invalid claims, the statute of
limitations operates in these
cases to present the valid
claims of unsuspecting
plaintiffs.
the revelation of the negligence; (3) no "causal break" be-
tween the malpractice and the injury; (4) no involvement
of diagnostic judgment or discretion; and (5) no danger of
a false claim.
5 0
The Flanagan factors arguably point to a discovery rule
with hazardous substance cases, as much as with negligent
surgical procedures. A toxic chemical that is unknowingly
inhaled or ingested is as much a "foreign object" in a body
as is a clamp of which the patient did not know. A defen-
dant's ability to defend a claim is not impaired; often, a
chemical is stored in the body and retains its identity over
time as would a clamp. Just as hospital records are required
to document the malpractice and its revelation, state and
federal agencies' records document hazardous disposal
sites and the substances in them. Just as Flanagan required
no "break" between the malpractice and the injury, an in-
dividual's exposure to a chemical dump is constant,
especially when the existence of the dump is not known.
By applying the Flanagan factors to hazardous waste suits,
the possibility of false or frivolous suits is minimized, and
the application of the date of discovery rule would offer
more equitable results.
A second portent of change is that the three year per-
sonal injury statute of limitations has been amended twice
to ameliorate its harsh consequences. First, in 1975 the
state legislature adopted N.Y. Civ. Proc. Law § 214-a,
which, in medical malpractice "foreign objects" cases, allows
the action within one year from the date plaintiff discovers
the wrong or facts which would reasonably lead to its
discovery.5 ' This amendment has not been applied to
hazardous substance suits.
The second amendment to the New York statute of
limitations was in 1981, in response to the "Agent Orange"
cases.52 The amendment allows a two year statute of limita-
tions for personal injuries caused by "phenoxy herbicides"
to armed forces personnel serving in Viet Nam during
1962-1975. The two year limitation is commenced from
the discovery of the injury, or within two years from the
date the cause of the injury should have been discovered
through reasonable diligence. The amendment also revives
claims already barred by the statute of limitations.
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In view of the plethora
of other hazardous
substances that exist
or are coming into be-
ing, it is inequitable
and short-sighted of
the legislature to enact
such a chemical- and
plaintiff-specific
statute.
Without questioning the health problems addressed
by this section, 3 the amendment presents serious ine-
quities. Only armed services personnel are allowed to utilize
this section; civilians who worked in plants producing
trichloralphenol and lived in surrounding communities, or
who lived where it was dumped in New York are not allow-
ed to use this section to sue for personal injuries.5 4 Nothing
in the section limits it to New York resident veteran plain-
tiffs. Accordingly, a nonresident veteran could utilize this
section, while a resident civilian plaintiff could not. In view
of the plethora of other hazardous substances that exist
or are coming into being, it is inequitable and short- sighted
of the legislature to enact such a chemical- and plaintiff-
specific statute. Steinhardt limits this section to Agent
Orange cases, holding "further extension of the limited
discovery provision... was a matter best reserved for the
legislature, and not the courts."5 5 This method of amen-
ding the statute of limitations in a piecemeal fashion works
an invidious discrimination on injured plaintiffs and is in-
adequate to reach the problem of hazardous substance
exposure.
The third indication of change in New York State is
manifested by the bills introduced in the 207th Legislative
Session to amend N.Y. Civ. Proc. Law § 214. Bills have
been introduced in previous sessions, but have never been
voted upon by both houses.
The bills fall into two categories: substance-specific
discovery rule bills and general hazardous substance
discovery rule bills. The first category of substance-specific
bills would provide for a three year discovery rule for
asbestos and diethylstilbestrol (D.E.S.) exposure. 56 A
discovery rule for asbestos exposure is considered
necessary due to the long latency period between inhala-
tion of the asbestos fiber and the onset of disease. A variety
of serious diseases result from exposure including
asbestosis, emphysema, mesothelioma, and cancer of the
gastointestional tract. In the case of. asbestos, latency
periods of twenty to forty years are nof uncommon. Dur-
ing the long latency period, plaintiffs cannot successfully
maintain a lawsuit because there is no apparent Injury,
disability, or damage.57
Assembly Bill 3593 would provide a discovery statute
of limitations for those persons who sustained personal in-
jury caused by exposure to D.E.S. D.E.S. has been found
to cause serious health problems, such as genital car-
cinomas and glandular imbalances, in both female and male
children of women who ingested D.E.S. during pregnancy.
A gross inequity exists for those children of D.E.S. mothers
who become ill after reaching their twenty-first birthday.
In cases involving personal injuries to minors, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff reaches
eighteen, then it runs its usual three year course. D.E.S.
children who become ill prior to turning twenty-one may
sue, those who become ill afterward may not.58
Bills that would make an exception to the statute of
limitations for a particular substance are subject to the same
criticisms as the Agent Orange amendment. Victims of
asbestos or D.E.S. exposure present compelling cases for
compensation for their injuries; however, victims of ex-
This method of amen-





jured plaintiffs and is
inadequate to reach
the problem of hazard-
ous substance
exposure.
posure to other hazardous substances present equally com-
pelling cases for compensation. Substance-specific amend-
ments make the existing law cumbersome and confusing.
It is not clear what criteria are used to choose which
substance shall be an exception under the statute of limita-
tions. The problem with hazardous substance exposure is
plaintiff's ignorance of injury. This problem is not isolated
to Agent Orange, asbestos, or D.E.S. exposure.
The second category of bills provides for a two or three
year discovery rule for exposure to hazardous substances.
The bills A. 6150, A. 10067, A. 9106, and A. 3547 pro-
vide for compensation for personal injury as well as pro-
perty damages; S. 6286 only extends the statute of limita-
tions for personal injury.
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The memoranda supporting these bills refer to the "cur-
rent injustice" of the present state of New York law. Each
memorandum asserts that, as a matter of fundamental
justice, a right to recover for personal injury or property
damage should run from the time the injury is discovered.
Assembly Bill 10067, submitted at the request of the
Office of Court Administration, would allow a two year
discovery rule for injury resulting from toxic or harmful
substances or hazardous waste. The two year period is
parallel to the two year period in the Agent Orange amend-
ment. This bill would not revive claims previously barred
by the existing statute of limitations. After studying the
issue, the Advisory Committee on Civil Practice submit-
ted this bill and represented its belief that the time has come
for New York State to adopt a discovery rule.59
Two remaining bills, A. 3547 and A. 9106, provide
for a two year and three year discovery rule respectively
and provide for punitive damages. Both bills require a "clear
and convincing" standard of proof for awarding punitive
damages. Assembly Bill 9106, introduced at the request
of the Governor, provides somewhat greater coverage than
A. 3547. In addition to the provision for a three year
discovery rule in A. 9106, the Governor's bill would award
punitive damages to "persons" whose injury or death is the
result of the defendant's reckless disregard for their safe-
ty. In comparison, A. 3547 provides for a two year
discovery rule and authorizes punitive damages when the
injury or death is the result of the defendant's reckless
disregard for the safety of "consumers".
The latter two bills, A. 3547 and A. 9106, raise the
question of whether punitive damages are appropriate in
personal injury cases. The rationale for a discovery rule is
to allow a plaintiff who is ignorant of an injury to bring suit
when the injury is discovered and receive compensation
if the claim is legally sufficient. Notions of fault and punitive
damages are not part of this rationale and may be inap-
plicable to these cases. Further, this provision may affect
the bills' political viability. It has already been shown how
difficult it is to establish a discovery rule in New York State,
whether by judicial determination or by statute. The provi-
sion for punitive damages adds a substantive aspect to a
change in the law that would otherwise be primarily pro-
cedural in effect. An intensive lobbying effort may operate
against exposure to this type of liability, as the bills do not
specify a cap on punitive damages or compensatory
damages; however, the Assembly bills are not without
broad based political support.
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At the end of the 207th Legislative Session, only two
bills, A. 3593 and A. 3547, were voted upon and passed
by the Assembly. No bills were reported out of the Codes
Committee in the Senate, nor voted upon by the Senate.
Although a date of discovery rule did not win legislative
approval, the number and variety of bills presented clearly
demonstrate that the issue is at the forefront of political
activity. The bills show an effort by a variety of groups,
from the Governor and legislators to interest groups, to
resolve the statute of limitations problem in a equitable
manner. The problems caused, or that will be caused, by
hazardous substances to innocent parties' health or pro-
perty are acknowledged as among today's crucial issues.
An underlying principle of tort law is to deter the conduct
causing the personal and property damage, while compen-
sating injuries. This principle is not being served while in-
jured parties are prevented from trying their cases because
of an unrealistic procedural rule. All an amendment to the
statute of limitations would do is allow plaintiffs' claims
to be heard on their merits. It is incumbent upon this new-
ly convened legislature to address the needs of all people
injured by hazardous substances and enact legislation that
would resolve the inequity in the present statute of limita-
tions law.
CONCLUSION
Under current New York law a victim of exposure to
hazardous substances can be time-barred from recovering
for personal injuries. By requiring an injured party to bring
suit within three years from the date of last exposure, all
judicial remedies are effectively abolished for victims who
contracted diseases with long latency periods.
Strict adherence to the exposure rule becomes
untenable when it is understood that many injuries resulting
from hazardous substance exposure cannot reasonably be
discovered within three years from the date of last ex-
posure. The injured parties' cases present valid claims;
these cases should be heard on their merits, not predeter-
mined by mechanical application of a statute of limitations.
New York's current rule does not pose a reasonable cut-
off period, nor does it serve the policy considerations for
which it was enacted.
Given the Court of Appeals' reluctance to break with
precedent, the state legislature should acknowledge the
needs of'all the state's citizens and in the new legislative
session enact a date of discovery rule for accrual of time
under the statute of limitations for injuries resulting from
exposure to hazardous substances. In the meantime, the
courts should promote public confidence in the judicial
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